The Tuvalu Position on REDD deserves strong AOSIS, Pacific, and Indigenous Peoples’ support in the outcome of COP15 of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen
Special guest article from Fiu Mata’ese Elisara/Executive Director of OLSSI – Samoa
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The Different Proposals on REDD in the UNFCCC: REDD proposals will lead to forest protection only if the needs and rights of local communities are being effectively addressed. Unfortunately with the exception of the proposals by Tuvalu and Norway, most do not sufficiently respect local peoples’ rights. With assessments also from FERN and Forest Peoples Program (FPP), the following are pertinent comments relevant to this call for support for the Tuvalu and Norway positions on REDD.
Forest Retention Scheme: Tuvalu has proposed a Forest Retention Scheme to provide incentives to communities for protecting and retaining forests. There are three components to this scheme, which include a Community Forest Retention Trust Account; Forest Retention Certificates and an International Forest Retention Fund to provide funding for communities to set aside forest areas or to manage them in a sustainable manner. Communities could draw on a prescribed percentage of their own trust account, to establish measures to combat and reduce deforestation and degradation.
Community Forest Retention Trust Accounts (CFRT Account) : Communities that wish to establish projects to conserve forest areas or manage them on a sustainable basis would seek funding to establish a CFRT Account. Communities could draw on a prescribed percentage of this account to establish measures to combat emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. The remaining amount would be set aside in the CFRT Account. A community could then draw upon the interest from the Account on an annual basis, based on the concept of being paid an annual ‘rent for environmental services’.
Forest Retention Certificates: Once the CFRT Account is established, communities could apply for Forest Retention Certificates which are based on an estimate of the amount of GHG reduced by the project (based on current emission trends compared with potential actions to reduce these emission trends). At the end of a prescribed period (five years) certificates equivalent to a determined amount of CO2 avoided would be issued by national governments, which would need to report annually to the COP. A committee would be established under the COP to ensure that there was not an over-issuance of these certificates. At the end of a prescribed period of time (possibly ten years), the area of forest originally set aside or sustainably managed by the community would be independently assessed. An independent auditor would also assess whether the CFRT account was still in operation. If the project and the account are verified, communities could redeem a prescribed percentage of their Certificates. This process would be repeated every ten years.
International Forest Retention Fund: Funding for the redemption of these Certificates would come from a proposed International Forest Retention Fund established under the Convention. Tuvalu has suggested a levy on inter-national aviation and bunker fuels to finance this fund, which could raise in the region of US$24 billion annually. Redemption of the Certificates would be granted ex-post, although communities have had access to interest from the initial CFRT Account. Communities could deposit these redeemed Certificates into their CFRT Account or use the money as the community sees fit. Procedures for assessment and auditing would be kept as simple as possible to minimize transaction costs. The Certificates could only be redeemed to the International Forest Retention Fund. The fundamental component of this scheme is founded on the principle that the certificates cannot be sold, transferred or traded.
Tuvalu does not support forest carbon trading, largely because leakage will inevitably occur so long as the demand for global commodities continues to put pressure on forests. Tuvalu has recently proposed addressing international leakage through demand-side measures. This would mean that importing countries would have to ensure that forest product imports are derived from sustainably managed forest. Ian Fry suggests creating carbon deficit levies (CDLs) for importing countries. Annex I parties would then accumulate CDLs for importing forest products resulting from deforestation activities in developing countries. These would appear as emissions in national GHG inventories and so would in effect be the opposite of certified emissions reductions (CERs), whereby countries would be adding emission increases to their assigned amount.
Norway: Substantial, predictable, results-based and long-term financial flows to developing countries are required for a post-2012 REDD mechanism – and establishing such flows should be the focus of the mechanism, as it is these flows that make REDD different from past forest protection schemes. Therefore a robust, effective and sustainable system for mobilizing financial resources, and a credible results-based mechanism to distribute them, should be the corner-stone of a future REDD mechanism. Biodiversity should be protected through careful policy design, and any regime should ensure the involvement of indigenous peoples and local communities, who should be involved in the construction of mechanisms that compensate them for the forest protection they promote.
The proposal advocates a combination of fund- and market-based mechanisms. Markets are needed to mobilize the private sector, although they are less effective for countries with low rates of deforestation, and less relevant for capacity-building activities. REDD must be additional to deep emissions cuts from Annex 1 countries – so a market-based mechanism will require collective emissions cuts from developed countries of more than 25% – 40%. If a fund-based mechanism is used, it is essential that adequate finances are raised (relying on development aid type donations will not be acceptable). To this end Norway has proposed a system for the auctioning of allowances as a potential source of REDD funding.
The focus should primarily be on REDD, but incentives also need to account for conservation, sustainable forest management, and enhanced carbon stocks to provide incentives for countries with historically low deforestation rates, or those who have stopped deforesting. A broad scope including all forest activities will reduce the risk of leakage. An independent monitoring system will be required (of emission reductions and reference levels) to ensure credibility.
Reference levels in principle should be based on historical emissions data, but due to the lack of incentives that this principle would provide for countries with historically low rates of deforestation, Norway is open to other approaches for setting reference levels. A national approach, eventually leading to monitoring of all forests in the country, is needed to account for intra-national leakage. International leakage must be addressed. In the early stages, when fewer countries are participating, approaches to address international leakage need to be explored, although Norway has no specific suggestions in this proposal.
The proposal also suggests that there should be close coordination and integration of preparations made through the United Nations REDD Initiative, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and other initiatives: not as a substitute for REDD under the UNFCCC, but to stimulate early action and capacity building.
